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On 21 July 2011 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued its much 
awaited decision in the case of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States.1  In a 
landmark judgment the Commission found the United States of America to be in 
violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 due to the 
failure of the state to protect a victim of domestic violence and her children.  This paper 
seeks to analyse the Lenahan decision and its significance for the United States.  In 
particular, the substantial influence of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the Commission’s reasoning will be examined.   
 
1. The Facts of the Case 
 
The case arose from a petition presented to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights against the Government of the United States of America by representatives of the 
American Civil Liberties Union.  The petition was presented on behalf of Jessica 
Lenahan, formerly Jessica Gonzales, and her three deceased daughters.  The claimants 
argued that the United States had violated a number of provisions of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, due to a failure to exercise due diligence in 
protecting Jessica Lenahan and her daughters from acts of domestic violence on the part 
of Ms Lenahan’s former husband (Simon Gonzales).  It was claimed that the police had 
failed to respond in an adequate manner to Ms Lenahan’s repeated and urgent telephone 
calls reporting that her husband had taken their three daughters, who were aged seven, 
eight and ten, in violation of a domestic violence restraining order held by Ms Lenahan.  
Simon Gonzales had eventually arrived at the police station and opened fire at police.  
The police returned fire, resulting in his death.  The three children were later found shot 
to death in the back of their father’s truck.  The petitioners claimed that the state had 
never duly investigated the circumstances of the deaths of the children, and had never 
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provided Ms Lenahan with a sufficient remedy for the failures of the police.  It was 
argued that these circumstances amounted to violations of a number of provisions of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, including Article I (the right to 
life), Article II (the right to equality), Article VII (relating to the special protection of 
children), and Article XVIII (the right to judicial protection).     
 
The state, on the other hand, argued that the authorities had responded as they 
were required to do by law.  Moreover, it claimed that the petitioners had cited no 
provision of the American Declaration that imposed on the state an affirmative duty to 
prevent the commission of individual crimes by private actors.  Nevertheless, the Inter-
American Commission held that the United States had failed to act with due diligence to 
protect Ms Lenahan and her three daughters from domestic violence, in breach of Articles 
I, II, VII and XVIII of the American Declaration.      
 
2. The Commission’s Reasoning 
 
A. The Right to Equality 
 
Article II of the American Declaration states that, ‘All persons are equal before the law 
and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, creed or any other factor.’  The petitioners argued that discrimination 
in violation of Article II was ‘the common thread’ in all of the state’s failures to 
guarantee the rights of Ms Lenahan and her daughters.2  They claimed that the state’s 
failure to respond adequately to Ms Lenahan’s telephone calls regarding the 
disappearance of her daughters, its failure to conduct an investigation into the children’s 
deaths, and its failure to offer Ms Lenahan an appropriate remedy as regards the lack of 
enforcement of the restraining order, all constituted acts of discrimination in violation of 
Article II. 
 
In its judgment, the Commission commented that, ‘The principle of non-
discrimination is the backbone of the universal and regional systems for the protection of 
human rights.’3  In ensuring this principle,  
States are not only obligated to provide for equal protection of the law.  They 
must also adopt the legislative, policy and other measures necessary to guarantee 
the effective enjoyment of the rights protected under Article II…In practice this 
means that States have the obligation to adopt the measures necessary to 
recognize and guarantee the effective equality of all persons before the law; to 
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abstain from introducing in their legal framework regulations that are 
discriminatory towards certain groups either in their face or in practice; and to 
combat discriminatory practices.4  
In applying these obligations to the area of violence against women, the Commission 
stated that, ‘Gender-based violence is one of the most extreme and pervasive forms of 
discrimination, severely impairing and nullifying the enforcement of women’s rights.’5  It 
proceeded to assert that, ‘The obligations established in Article II extend to the 
prevention and eradication of violence against women, as a crucial component of the 
State’s duty to eliminate both direct and indirect forms of discrimination.  In accordance 
with this duty, State responsibility may be incurred for failures to protect women from 
domestic violence perpetrated by private actors in certain circumstances.’6  The 
Commission was of the view that the United States had failed to fulfil their obligations 
under Article II as regards the situation in question, and therefore found a violation in 
respect of this provision. 
 
B. The Right to Life 
 
Article I of the American Declaration states that, ‘Every human being has the right to life, 
liberty and the security of his person.’  The Commission commented that, ‘Various 
international human rights bodies have moreover considered State failures in the realm of 
domestic violence not only discriminatory, but also violations of the right to life of 
women.’7  It stated that, ‘The right to life is one of the core rights protected by the 
American Declaration which has undoubtedly attained the status of customary 
international law.’8  The Commission was of the view that,  
The protection of the right to life is a critical component of a State’s due diligence 
obligation to protect women from acts of violence.  This legal obligation pertains 
to the entire state institution, including the actions of those entrusted with 
safeguarding the security of the State, such as the police forces.  It also extends to 
the obligations a State may have to prevent and respond to the actions of non-state 
actors and private persons.9 
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The Commission held that the state had failed to take reasonable measures to protect the 
lives of Ms Lenahan’s three daughters, and that this failure therefore constituted a 
violation of their right to life, as contained in Article I of the American Declaration. 
 
C. The Right of Children to Special Protection 
 
Article VII of the American Declaration provides that, ‘All women, during pregnancy 
and the nursing period, and all children, have the right to special protection, care and aid.’  
In applying this provision to the area of domestic violence, the Commission stated that, 
‘Protection measures are considered particularly critical in the case of girl-
children…since they may be at a greater risk of human rights violations based on two 
factors, their sex and age.’10  Again, the Commission held that the state had failed to 
provide adequate protection measures to the three children in question, and that this 
failure constituted a violation of Article VII.   
 
D. The Right to Judicial Protection 
 
Article XVIII of the American Declaration provides that, ‘Every person may resort to the 
courts to ensure respect for his legal rights.  There should likewise be available to him a 
simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to 
his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.’  The Commission stated that 
there had been a failure on the part of the state to undertake a proper inquiry into the non-
enforcement of the domestic violence protection order which had been in place against 
Ms Lenahan’s former husband.  In addition, the state had failed to perform a prompt, 
thorough and impartial investigation into the deaths of her three daughters, and had failed 
to convey information to the family relevant to the circumstances of their deaths.  There 
had thus been a violation of Article XVIII also. 
 
2. The Commission’s Recommendations 
 
The Commission concluded its decision by making a series of wide-ranging 
recommendations to the United States.  These included that the state should undertake an 
impartial and exhaustive investigation into the deaths of Ms Lenahan’s daughters.  It 
should also conduct an investigation into the failures relating to the enforcement of the 
protection order, with the aim of ensuring that such failures would not re-occur.  An 
inquiry should be carried out with the aim of holding those responsible to account.  In 
addition, full reparations should be offered to Ms Lenahan. 
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At a broader level, the Commission asserted that it was necessary for the United 
States to ‘adopt multifaceted legislation at the federal and state levels, or reform existing 
legislation, including protection measures for children in the context of domestic 
violence.’11  The Commission stated that these measures should be accompanied by 
adequate resources to foster their implementation; regulations to ensure their 
enforcement; training programmes for the law enforcement officials who would be 
involved in their execution; and the design of model directives to be followed by police 
departments.  The state should also adopt legislation, or reform existing legislation, with 
the aim of ensuring the protection of children in the context of domestic violence.  In 
addition, the Commission recommended that the United States, 
Continue adopting public policies and institutional programs aimed at 
restructuring the stereotypes of domestic violence victims, and to promote the 
eradication of discriminatory socio-cultural patterns that impede women and 
children’s full protection from domestic violence acts, including programs to train 
public officials in all branches of the administration of justice and police, and 
comprehensive prevention programs.12      
Finally, it was recommended that the state design protocols specifying the proper 
components of how an investigation of a report of missing children in the context of a 
violation of a restraining order should be carried out. 
 
3. The Influence of the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
In its decision in this case the Inter-American Commission referred extensively to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of domestic violence.  
Until 2007 domestic violence had not been directly addressed substantively by the 
European Court, however in the past four years the Court has directly addressed this issue 
in a series of cases.  These include Kontrova v Slovakia;13 Bevacqua and S v Bulgaria;14  
Branko Tomasic and Others v Croatia;15 Opuz v Turkey;16 E.S. and Others v Slovakia;17 
and A v Croatia.18  In the Lenahan case the Inter-American Commission stated that the 
                                                 
11 Ibid. at para 215. 
 
12 Ibid. at para 215. 
 
13 Application No 7510/04, Merits, 24 September 2007. 
 
14 Application No 71127/01, Merits, 12 September 2008. 
 
15 Application No 46598/06, Merits, 15 January 2009. 
 
16 Application No 33401/02, Merits, 9 September 2009. 
 
17 Application No 8227/04, Merits, 15 December 2009. 
 
18 Application No 55164/08, Merits, 14 October 2010. 
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European Court has, in its jurisprudence, ‘advanced important principles related to the 
scope and content of the State’s obligation to prevent acts of domestic violence.’19  The 
Commission proceeded to comment that, 
The European Court has considered the obligation to protect as one of reasonable 
means, and not results, holding the State responsible when it failed to take 
reasonable measures that had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating 
the harm.  The Court has established that authorities should consider the 
prevalence of domestic violence, its hidden nature and the casualties of this 
phenomenon in the adoption of protection measures; an obligation which may be 
applicable even in cases where victims have withdrawn their complaints.  Given 
the nature of domestic violence, under certain circumstances authorities may have 
reason to know that the withdrawal of a complaint may signify a situation of 
threats on the part of the aggressor, or the State may at a minimum be required to 
investigate that possibility.  Lastly, the Court has ruled that a State’s failure to 
protect women from domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of 
the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional.20    
 
In its reasoning, the Inter-American Commission referred in particular to the 
European Court’s decisions in Kontrova v Slovakia;21 Opuz v Turkey22 and Branko 
Tomasic and Others v Croatia.23  In Kontrova v Slovakia the applicant had been 
subjected to domestic violence by her husband.  He had threatened to kill himself and 
their two children and he had in fact carried out this threat.  There were thus very clear 
similarities between the facts of this case and those of the Lenahan case.  The applicant in 
Kontrova alleged that the police had failed to take appropriate action to protect her 
children’s lives under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, and 
her own private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention, despite knowing of her 
husband’s abusive behaviour.  Under domestic law in Slovakia, the police had various 
specific obligations, such as accepting and registering the applicant’s complaint; 
launching a criminal investigation; and commencing proceedings against the applicant’s 
husband immediately.  However, they had failed to comply with any of these obligations.   
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21 Supra n 13. 
 
22 Supra n 16. 
 
23 Supra n 15. 
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In holding that there had been a breach of the children’s right to life, the Court 
stated that Article 2, ‘enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and 
unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction...It also extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive 
obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an 
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.’24  The 
applicant alleged that the violation of Article 2 also constituted a violation of her own 
private and family life under Article 8, however the Court held that in the light of the 
finding of a violation of Article 2, it was not necessary to examine the case under Article 
8 also. 
 
Opuz v Turkey25 was another case from the European Court which bore 
similarities to the facts of the Lenahan case, in that both cases concerned victims of 
domestic violence who had family members who had been killed by the perpetrators.  In 
Opuz both the applicant and the applicant’s mother had been subjected to violence on the 
part of the applicant’s husband.  The applicant alleged that the authorities had failed to 
protect herself and her mother from domestic violence, which had resulted in the death of 
her mother and her own ill-treatment.  She complained that the authorities had failed to 
safeguard the right to life of her mother in violation of Article 2 of the Convention.  The 
Court concluded that ‘The criminal law system, as applied in the instant case, did not 
have an adequate deterrent effect capable of ensuring the effective prevention of the 
unlawful acts committed by (the applicant’s husband).’26  There had thus been a breach 
of Article 2.  
 
The applicant also argued that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention, which contains the right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  She alleged that she had been subjected to violence, injury and death threats 
but that the authorities had been negligent towards her situation, which caused her pain 
and fear in breach of Article 3.  The Court concluded that there had indeed been a 
violation of Article 3 ‘as a result of the State authorities’ failure to take protective 
measures in the form of effective deterrence against serious breaches of the applicant’s 
personal integrity by her husband.’27 
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26 Ibid. at para 153. 
 
27 Ibid. at para 176. 
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In addition, the applicant claimed that there had been a breach of Article 14 of the 
Convention, the prohibition of discrimination, an argument which was also upheld by the 
Court.  The applicant demonstrated through statistical data that domestic violence 
affected mainly women, and established that judicial passivity in Turkey created a 
climate conducive to domestic violence.  It was stated that, ‘Bearing in mind...that the 
general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey, albeit unintentional, mainly 
affected women, the Court considers that the violence suffered by the applicant and her 
mother may be regarded as gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination 
against women.’28  Such an approach was also followed by the Inter-American 
Commission in its decision in the Lenahan case.  In its decision the Commission clearly 
stated that, ‘The principle of non-discrimination is the backbone of the universal and 
regional systems for the protection of human rights.’29  In finding a violation of Article II 
of the American Declaration, the Commission was forceful in its view that, ‘Gender-
based violence is one of the most extreme and pervasive forms of discrimination, 
severely impairing and nullifying the enforcement of women’s rights.’30   It seems that 
the approach of the European Court on the application of the principle of non-
discrimination to gender-based violence clearly influenced the Inter-American 
Commission’s reasoning in the Lenahan case. 
 
The Inter-American Commission also referred to the case of Branko Tomasic and 
Others v Croatia31 from the European Court.  In this case the applicants were relatives of 
a victim of domestic violence who had been shot dead, along with her daughter, by her 
former partner who had then committed suicide.  The perpetrator had previously been 
found guilty by a Croatian court of repeatedly threatening that he would kill himself, his 
former partner and their child with a bomb.  He was sentenced to five months’ 
imprisonment and was ordered to have compulsory psychiatric treatment during his 
imprisonment and afterwards as necessary.  An appeal court later reduced the treatment 
to the duration of his sentence.  One month after his release he killed himself, his former 
partner and their child.  The applicants argued that there had been violations of the right 
to life under Article 2 of the European Convention and the right to an effective remedy 
under Article 13 of the Convention.  The basis of the complaints was that the state had 
failed to take sufficient measures to protect the victims, and had also failed to conduct an 
effective investigation into the possible responsibility of the state for the deaths.    
 
                                                 
28 Ibid. at para 200. 
 
29 Supra n 1 at para 107. 
 
30 Supra n 1 at para 110. 
 
31 Supra n 15. 
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The European Court held that there had indeed been a breach of Article 2.  No 
search of the perpetrator’s premises and vehicle had been carried out during the initial 
criminal proceedings, despite the fact that he had repeatedly threatened to use a bomb.  In 
addition, although a psychiatric report which had been drawn up for the purposes of the 
criminal proceedings had emphasised the need for continued psychiatric treatment, the 
state had failed to ensure that the perpetrator had indeed been properly treated.  In fact, he 
had not followed an individual programme during the prison term despite this being 
required by law.  Also, he had not been examined immediately prior to his release from 
prison in order to assess whether he had posed a risk to the victims.  Interestingly, having 
found that there had been a violation of Article 2 due to the failure of the state to take 
sufficient measures to protect the victims, the Court held that there was no need to 
examine separately the complaint that the state had failed to undertake a thorough 
investigation into the possible responsibility of its agents for the deaths of the victims.  It 
could perhaps be argued that it would have been preferable if the Court had examined 
this complaint also, for the sake of completeness.  However, it is the European Court’s 
common practice, having found a violation in one aspect of a case, to omit to examine 
arguments concerning other aspects of the situation in question.  Similarly, in Branko 
Tomasic the Court also held that, having found a violation of Article 2, there was no need 
to examine the complaint under Article 13. 
 
If the European Court in Branko Tomasic had examined the aspect of the case 
surrounding the lack of an effective investigation, this would have made the case even 
more pertinent to the Inter-American Commission’s decision in Lenahan.  However, the 
European Court has certainly developed jurisprudence on the procedural aspect of the 
right to life in many other cases.32  In the Lenahan case, the Inter-American Commission 
held that the state had failed to perform a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation 
into the deaths of the three children, and had failed to convey information to the family 
relevant to the circumstances of their deaths.  However, it is notable that this part of the 
case was examined in relation to Article XVIII of the American Declaration on the right 
to judicial protection, as opposed to Article I on the right to life.  It could certainly be 
argued, as in Branko Tomasic, that the state may have borne some responsibility for the 
deaths in question in the Lenahan case, due to the failure of the police to respond 
adequately to Ms Lenahan’s requests for help.  If the European Court in Branko Tomasic 
had examined the complaint regarding the lack of an effective investigation into the 
deaths in that case, it is possible that the Inter-American Commission may well have 
followed suit in Lenahan and analysed the lack of a sufficient investigation as a violation 
of the procedural aspect of the right to life also.   
                                                 
32 For example, Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom (Application No 24746/94, Merits, 4 May 2001);  Kelly 
and Others v. United Kingdom (Application No 30055/96, Merits, 4 May 2001); McKerr v United Kingdom 
(Application No 28883/95, Merits, 4 May 2001); Shanaghan v United Kingdom (Application No 37715/97, 
Merits, 4 May 2001).  
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4. The Lenahan Case in the Context of United States Jurisprudence on Positive 
Duties  
  
 The decision of the Inter-American Commission in Lenahan is particularly significant 
given the strong opposition of the United States Supreme Court to the placing of positive 
duties on the state to protect individuals from the criminal acts of other individuals.  The 
seminal case in this area is the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in DeShaney v 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.33  In this case, the petitioner was a 
child who had been subjected to a series of beatings by his father.  The Department of 
Social Services had received complaints that the petitioner was being abused by his 
father, however although they took various steps to protect the petitioner, they did not 
remove him from his father's custody.  The petitioner's father finally beat him so severely 
that he suffered permanent brain damage.  The petitioner and his mother argued that the 
respondents had deprived the petitioner of his liberty interest in bodily integrity, in 
violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, by failing to intervene to protect him from his father's violence.  The 
Due Process Clause states that no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.’  The Supreme Court held that the respondents' 
failure to provide the petitioner with sufficient protection did not violate his rights under 
the Due Process Clause. 
 
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Clause imposed no duty on the 
state to provide members of the general public with adequate protective services. 
According to the Court, although the Clause forbade the state itself from depriving 
individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, it did not impose a 
positive obligation on the state to ensure that those interests did not come to harm 
through other means.  The petitioner had argued that the state's knowledge of his danger 
and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger had established a 
‘special relationship’ giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect.  
However, the Court held that such a ‘special relationship’ could arise only from 
limitations which the state itself had imposed on an individual’s freedom to act on his 
own behalf, for example through imprisonment.  The Due Process Clause did not 
therefore impose a positive duty on the state to provide the petitioner with sufficient 
protection.  
 
In relation to the issue of domestic violence, the impact of such reasoning was 
expressed succinctly in a recent report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences.  According to the Special 
                                                 
33 489 U.S. 189, 22 February 1989. 
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Rapporteur, ‘The effect of cases such as DeShaney...is that even where local and state 
police are grossly negligent in their duties to protect women’s right to physical security, 
and even where they fail to respond to an urgent call of assistance from victims of 
domestic violence, there is no constitutional or statutory remedy at the federal level.’34  
The fact that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has now found the 
United States to be in violation of several provisions of the American Declaration for its 
failure to provide adequate protection to a victim of domestic violence and her children is 
therefore of immense significance.  The obvious question that now arises is whether the 
United States will respond in a positive manner to this finding.  Unfortunately it is 
doubtful whether this will prove to be the case.  Prior to issuing its decision in Lenahan 
the Inter-American Commission sent a report on the merits of the case to the United 
States in order for the latter to report on its compliance with the recommendations issued.  
However, no response was received within the time period provided.  In its decision in 
Lenahan the Commission stated that, ‘Given the lack of information from the State, the 
Commission must conclude that the recommendations issued have not been implemented, 
and that their compliance thus remains pending.  The Commission is accordingly 
required to reiterate those recommendations and continue monitoring compliance.’35  It 
remains to be seen whether the United States will yet respond in a positive manner to the 
decision. 
 
The question of whether compliance will indeed occur is however somewhat 
debatable.  One of the primary problems with ensuring the effectiveness of international 
human rights law is the fact that it can be very difficult to compel states to comply with 
their duties.  As Byrnes comments, ‘The limitations of international law generally when it 
comes to enforcement of binding standards are well known, and international human 
rights law is no exception in that regard.’36  Merry states that, ‘Countries are concerned 
about their reputations in the international community, but they clearly differ in their 
vulnerability to international pressure depending on their size, wealth, form of 
government, and dependence on the international community for trade, aid, and other 
symbolic and material forms of exchange.’37  The United States is a case in point.  The 
                                                 
34 Statement from Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, at the 
conclusion of her fact finding mission to the United States of America, 8 February 2011, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10715&LangID=E [last accessed 
31 October 2011]. 
 
35 Supra n 1 at para 207. 
 
36 Byrnes, ‘Enforcement Through International Law and Procedures’ in Cook (ed), Human Rights of 
Women – National and International Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 
189 at 191-192. 
 
37 Merry, ‘Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System’ (2003) 28 
Law and Social Inquiry 941 at 959. 
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most powerful nation in the world has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 197938 or the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989,39 and tends to ratify other international 
human rights treaties only with extensive reservations.   
 
One of the treaties which have been ratified by the United States is the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.40  The compliance of the 
United States with its obligations under this treaty was most recently considered by the 
Human Rights Committee in 2006.  One of the recurring themes of the Committee’s 
Concluding Observations on the report of the United States was the failure of the State 
party to comply with its positive obligations under the treaty.  The Committee noted with 
concern, ‘the restrictive interpretation made by the State party of its obligations under the 
Covenant’.41  According to the Committee, one of the main difficulties in this regard was 
the failure of the United States ‘to take fully into consideration its obligation under the 
Covenant not only to respect, but also to ensure the rights prescribed by the Covenant’42.  
The Committee recommended that the State party ‘take positive steps, when necessary, to 
ensure the full implementation of all rights prescribed by the Covenant.’43  It seems 
therefore that the reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to place positive duties 
on the state to protect individuals from the criminal acts of other individuals is 
symptomatic of a wider failure on the part of the United States to comply with its positive 
obligations under international human rights law.     
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion therefore, the decision of the Inter-American Commission in Lenahan is 
certainly a very significant development as regards the application of human rights law to 
the issue of domestic violence.  In analysing the importance of this decision it must be 
remembered that until relatively recently domestic violence was not even viewed as a 
human rights issue.  Human rights law was originally developed in such a way as to 
create a public / private dichotomy, whereby human rights norms were applied in the 
                                                 
38 1249 UNTS 13. 
 
39 1577 UNTS 3. 
 
40 999 UNTS 171. 
 
41 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations regarding United States of America, 18 December 
2006, CCPR/C/USA/CO/C/Rev.1, at para 10. 
 
42 Ibid. at para 10. 
 
43 Ibid. at para 10. 
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public arena where the state was involved, but were not applied in the private sphere.  
Violence against women taking place in the home did not therefore fall within the ambit 
of the traditional interpretation of human rights law.  For this body of law to have 
developed to such an extent that the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, 
has now been held to be in violation of human rights standards for its failure to protect a 
victim of domestic violence and her children is certainly remarkable in itself.       
 
It must also be noted that the decision in Lenahan is one of a number of very 
recent developments in this area.  In the European context, the adoption by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of the Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in April 2011 is 
undoubtedly significant.  The Convention was opened for signature in Istanbul on 11 
May 2011 and was signed by 13 states.   The provisions of the Convention are 
comprehensive in nature, encompassing not only criminal justice responses, but also 
areas such as awareness raising and the provision of social support measures to victims.  
Likewise, on 15 September 2011 the European Court of Justice issued its judgment in 
Magatte Gueye and Valentin Salmeron Sanchez,44 a case relating to the extent to which 
the views of victims of domestic violence should be taken into account in criminal justice 
proceedings against their abusers.  Although the European Court of Justice ultimately 
decided that the human rights issues raised did not fall within its ambit, nevertheless the 
case raises some very interesting questions regarding the application of human rights law 
to this area.   
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is certainly to be commended 
for its decision in the Lenahan case.  The judgment gives further weight to the principle 
that the failure of a state to provide sufficient protection to victims of domestic violence 
constitutes a clear violation of human rights standards.  It will certainly prove interesting 
to observe the response of the United States to this decision.        
                                                 
44 Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10 (15 September 2011). 
 
